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Rumor rationales: The impact of message justification on article credibility 




We perform content analysis on a unique sample of 2,074 first-instance published takeover 
rumors to study how the rationale underlying a publication relates to its credibility and its 
association with firm returns and rumor accuracy. While most takeover rumors are inaccurate, 
we find that distinguishing between various justifications of potential takeover activity as 
provided within the published article serves to predict takeover announcements, subsequent firm 
abnormal returns, and – to a lesser extent – premiums. In addition, we note a clear distinction in 
results based upon the informative versus speculative nature of the rumor. We interpret this 
evidence as supportive of our hypothesis that the underlying rationale justifying the release of 
public information affects firm share prices and aids in predictability. 
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 “News stories rarely have a simple, predictable effect on the market.” – Shiller, 2005 
Public news announcements are a major mechanism for disseminating information to 
investors, allowing them to estimate firm values (Tetlock, 2010, Engelberg and Parsons, 2011, 
Griffin et al., 2011). Dougal et al. (2012) and Peress (2014) report a market-wide impact of the 
media, while Ryan and Taffler (2004) find that corporate news events drive a significant 
proportion of economically significant price changes in the 350 largest firms on the London 
Stock Exchange. Despite the importance of the financial media, relatively few papers explore in 
detail how investors interpret descriptive information and whether they efficiently incorporate 
that information into prices, primarily due to the difficulty in objectively quantifying such 
information (Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013). 
This article performs a rigorous content analysis of public news announcements in the 
context of takeover rumors. In particular, we quantify how the market responds to takeover 
rumors which are categorized according to the article’s motivation; i.e. the underlying 
rationale(s) justifying the article's publication as provided in the initial (‘scoop’) news source. 
We further identify which of these rumor justifications are ultimately proven to be most accurate, 
in that the rumored target firm becomes subject to a formal takeover announcement within one 
year. Such rumors represent an appropriate setting to examine the underlying arguments upon 
which public information is based, as mergers and acquisitions impact a wide range of 
stakeholders and are among the biggest investment decisions a company ever makes (Luo, 
2005); furthermore, takeovers on average result in offer premiums of over 46% (Betton, Eckbo, 
and Thorburn, 2009), with related rumors substantially responsible for price runups before a bid 
is formally announced (Betton et al., 2014).  
Not all rumors in the business press provide similar information upon which investors can 
base their decisions. To illustrate, compare two unrelated articles, the first appearing in the New 












Page | 3 
which read: “Getty Images …. has put itself on the auction block and could fetch more than $1.5 
billion, people briefed on the situation said Sunday. The firm hired Goldman Sachs to advise it 
on a potential sale, these people said. The company has attracted interest from several buyers, 
mostly private equity firms, including Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Bain Capital and others …. A 
spokeswoman for the company contacted last week said the company does not comment on 
‘rumors and speculation’.” The second article, appearing in the Dow Jones Newswires on 
February 19, 2010, entitled “Options Report: Traders Quick to Respond to Buyout Rumors” 
noted that: “Options traders proved willing to respond to several buyout rumors Friday…. In 
Myriad Genetics, traders picked up 3000 calls and just 300 puts, taking particular interest in the 
company’s March $24 calls. Those contracts are priced at $0.45 and make money if Myriad 
Genetics rises above $24.45. The stock recently traded for $22.30, gaining 3.3%.” 
Rather than treating these takeover rumors as having equivalent investor outcomes, we 
code each rumor according to textual elements which relate to the underlying rationale for the 
rumor’s existence. In the first article, the rumor article indicates an insider was cited, a financial 
advisor was hired, and private equity funds have expressed interest in the target firm. In the 
second article, the rationale for the rumor includes an increase in the number of call options 
placed on the target firm as well as unspecified pre-existing takeover chatter. We hypothesize 
that the nature of public information may differ in its immediate credibility and in its ultimate 
accuracy depending upon the underlying rationales justifying the rumor’s publication. The 
coding of such rumor justifications provides in-depth clarification on the informativeness of 
publicly available signals and forms the basis for much of our empirical analysis. 
We construct the largest database of first-instance takeover rumor articles to date, manually 
searching Capital IQ, Factiva, ProQuest, Standard & Poor’s Takeover Talk, and Zephyr to 
ultimately identify 2,074 “scoop” articles which first report a takeover rumor of a firm listed in 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database between 2002 and 2011. Once a 
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clean window of at least 180 days exists without similar rumors. We categorize rumors 
according to sixteen non-mutually exclusive takeover rationales as provided in the article text 
and note whether the rumor was denied by either the target firm, potential bidder, or both. We 
exclude rumors in which either the rumored bidder or target confirms that negotiations are 
underway to preserve a clear distinction between rumors and takeover announcements. We use 
the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database as the source of takeover announcement dates, but 
because results are heavily reliant on the existence and timing of such announcements, and SDC 
data accuracy has been heavily criticized (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003, Faccio and Masulis, 
2005, Barnes et al., 2014, Mulherin and Simsir, 2015), we conduct a manual search of both 
Factiva and Google to correct for announcement date errors and omissions.  
Through the use of takeover rumors, we investigate three main questions. First, which 
media article characteristics predict whether a rumor comes true? Second, do investors account 
for the characteristics that predict accuracy and which relate to future returns? Third, can 
investors combine signals available on the rumor date to predict outcomes? While our results 
arise from an analysis of takeover rumors, the benefits of analyzing article justifications and 
combined signals could be seen to apply to publicly available information in general. 
To address our first question on the determinants of accuracy, we estimate a series of logit 
regressions of the likelihood that a rumor comes true on rumor content, with extensive controls 
for variables previously found to predict takeovers. These control variables include multiple 
proxies for managerial motivation to pursue a deal, target newsworthiness, abnormal returns 
surrounding the rumor date, and year, industry, and news article fixed effects.   
To address our second question relating investor behavior to future outcomes, we first test 
whether the magnitude of the market’s immediate response to a rumor predicts its accuracy. We 
then provide multivariate analysis of both rumored target firm and rumored bidding firm 
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construct long-short portfolios based on either the predicted accuracy of rumor characteristics or 
on a combination of rumor characteristics as available over the rumor date period. 
To address our third question, we create two mutually exclusive categories of rumors based 
on the degree to which the rumor justification exhibits a demonstrable link to future takeover 
activity. In particular, we label as Speculative those rumors based solely on either takeover 
chatter or an increase in option activity in the target firm, with no further justification provided. 
Such rumors are often found in news sources such as Benzinga, The Fly on the Wall, or Street 
Insider, among others. We label as Informative those rumors based on at least three rumor 
justifications, excluding those labelled as speculative, hypothesizing that multiple takeover signal 
motivations will provide a stronger effect than one alone. This is similar in spirit to Kosfeld 
(2005, pp. 659) who asserts that “intensifying the communication increases the probability for 
agents to eventually believe in the rumour” and to Purnanandam and Seyhun (2017) who show 
that by following joint signals, there are significant gains in trading returns as compared to 
returns from trading strategies that only follow individual signals1. In essence, we create two 
simple and intuitive proxies of rumor credibility which are available to investors on the initial 
rumor date, and test for their relationship to accuracy and share price abnormal returns via a 
series of logistic and multivariate analyses. 
A number of interesting results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that there are 
various rumor rationales which are significantly positive predictors of future takeover 
announcements and that are associated with significant rumored firm abnormal returns prior to, 
on, and after the rumor date. For example, takeover rumors citing the potential for unique 
synergetic benefits are predictive of takeover announcements and result in significantly positive 
pre-rumor date bidder firm returns, while takeover rumors based on target firm distress result in 
significantly negative rumor date target firm returns (and significantly positive rumor date bidder 
                                                 
1 In fact, composite signals are commonly employed in finance, such as Altman’s (1968) Z Score or Gompers et al. 
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firm returns). These and other findings suggest that all takeover rumors should not be treated 
equally, as the literature often implicitly assumes, and in particular that the underlying 
justification for the rumor article has merit and deserves attention. 
Second, we find that the magnitude of the market’s response to the average rumor predicts 
the rumor’s accuracy, but not fully. Many rumor characteristics remain significantly related to 
accuracy after controlling for the stock market’s response, while the average target of a rumor 
experiences an abnormal return reversal, i.e. a rumor date overreaction, following the rumor 
publication. Surprisingly, rumor date underreaction also exists, particularly for rumors based on 
industry activity or for rumours citing the potential for unique synergetic benefits.  
Third, not all takeover announcements are considered good news for target firms around 
the announcement date, and factors which predict takeover announcements in general are not 
identical to those which predict takeover announcements beneficial to target firms2. In particular, 
rumor date runup abnormal returns, CAR(-5, -1), as well as rumors in which the target denies that 
takeover negotiations are underway, TargetDenied, are significant predictors of beneficial 
takeover announcements but not takeover announcements in general. This suggests that some 
investors have access to information contained within the initial rumor article shortly prior to its 
release, and can distinguish the share price effect this will have on the target firm.  
Fourth, we find that Informative (Speculative) rumor rationales are significantly positive 
(negative) predictors of impending takeover announcements, and are significantly positively 
(negatively) related to rumor date target firm returns. These findings suggest that the degree to 
which the rumor is demonstrably linked to future takeover activity is important; in particular, 
rumors providing multiple signals of explained linkages (i.e., informative rumors) are not only 
more accurate than those providing vague linkages (i.e., speculative rumors), but are also 
deemed to be more credible on the rumor date, and more likely to result in abnormal return 
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continuations than reversals over the post-rumor period. Additionally, an equally-weighted 
portfolio which is long on target firms subject to Informative rumors and short on target firms 
subject to Speculative rumors provides 1.09% monthly returns over the one-year post-rumor 
period, significant at the 1% level. Similarly, an equally-weighted portfolio which is long on 
targets having rumor characteristics predictive of rumor accuracy and short on rumors with no 
significant prediction power provides statistically significant monthly returns of 1.06% over the 
following year3.  
Fifth, we find that certain rumor types are associated with significantly positive bidder firm 
abnormal returns both prior to and during the rumor date period. Rumor dates are an average 
(median) 130.14 (98) days prior to any forthcoming takeover, supporting the viewpoint that 
bidder announcement period returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding (Cai et al., 
2011).  
Finally, we contribute to the debate on the rumor effect on premiums: Chou et al. (2015) 
find a significantly positive effect, whereas Ahern and Sosyura (2015) do not. We find that the 
length of the runup period is important in order to ascertain the association: a longer runup 
incorporates substantially more initial target firm rumor publications. This increases returns over 
the runup period enough to offset decreases during the markup period, resulting in an overall 
insignificant association. However, rumors cited by an insider have a positive effect, whereas 
rumors initiated by the target have a negative effect. 
Our study relates to a rapidly growing area of research on financial content analysis which 
quantifies the breadth, content, timing, and/or tone of descriptive public information and 
examines how the market interprets it. For example, Fang and Peress (2009) find that stocks with 
no media coverage earn higher returns than stocks with high media coverage, suggesting that the 
breadth of information dissemination affects stock returns; Tetlock (2011) finds that firms react 
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less to stale news yet trade more aggressively on it; Guran and Butler (2012) find that news 
content varies systematically with the characteristics and conflicts of interest of the source; 
Tetlock (2007),  Tetlock et al. (2008), Loughran and McDonald (2011), Jegadeesh and Wu 
(2013) and others find relationships between article tone and various measures of financial 
performance; and Chen et al. (2014) conduct a textual analysis of articles published on Seeking 
Alpha, a popular social media website, and find that the views expressed in both articles and 
commentaries predict future stock returns and earnings surprises. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on share price momentum and reversals. Daniel 
et al. (1998) model investor behavior based on overconfidence and biased self-attribution, with 
investors maintaining prior beliefs and discounting public signals, resulting in underreaction to 
public information; Barberis et al. (1998) present a model based on investor sentiment in which 
stock prices underreact to earnings announcements and similar events while overreacting to 
consistent patterns of good or bad news; Hong and Stein (1999) build a model with two types of 
rational agents, “newswatchers” and “momentum traders”, finding both underreaction and 
overreaction from gradually diffusing news about fundamentals; Chan (2003) finds that stocks 
with bad news exhibit momentum while stocks experience reversals only if unaccompanied by 
public news; and Hoitash and Krishnan (2008) find that investors overreact for firms showing a 
high degree of speculative intensity. In finding an initial public announcement which leads to 
either underreaction or overreaction according to the justification provided for the rumor, our 
empirical results suggest article rationale as a contributing factor of share price momentum. 
Finally, our paper relates to the empirical literature on takeover rumors. Zivney et al. 
(1996) use the “Abreast of the Market” (AOTM) column of the Wall Street Journal in addition to 
the HOTS column to find 302 initial rumor publications. They find that rumor date runups exist, 
which are substantially higher for those rumors turning out to be true. Moreover, they find that 
rumored target firms published in the AOTM column experience overreaction on the rumor date, 
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(2015) agree that trading on rumors can be profitable by virtue of utilizing pre-rumor day 
abnormal returns as a signal of rumor accuracy. In a sample of 519 initial takeover rumors over 
the period 2005–2011, Ma and Zhang (2016) find that investors overreact to acquisition rumors. 
Jia et al. (2017) find that market reaction and accuracy are related to tweet volume in a sample of 
474 initial rumors over the period 2009–2014. 
In the paper most similar to ours, Ahern and Sosyura (2015) provide a thorough analysis of 
501 initial merger rumors from the Factiva database over the years 2000–2011. They make a 
substantial contribution to the literature, finding that target newsworthiness, journalist 
characteristics, article characteristics, and media sources are significantly related to rumor 
accuracy and rumor date returns. They also find that the market overreacts to the average merger 
rumor, while premiums remain unaffected. We find market reversal on the average merger rumor 
only when it is false, while the rumor’s association with the premium depends on the length of 
the runup period employed. 
Additionally, while they do examine certain article characteristics, such as the reported 
stage of the merger and the ambiguity of the language used in the article, they do not focus on 
the justification of the rumor message itself as we do (i.e. the sixteen rumor characteristics we 
identify, as well as our categorical groupings into a speculative and informative nature). We 
believe that this is critical, as these explain why the article was ostensibly written, presenting 
investors with the factual arguments underlying the rationale to publish the article. Investors can 
thus base their investment decisions on more than “just a rumor”: they instead can base their 
investment decisions on the claims established within the rumor article, often having an 
opportunity to verify such claims (e.g., whether a block purchase of target shares did indeed 
occur, and whether it may represent a threat to corporate control; or whether a financial advisor 
specializing in mergers was indeed hired, and whether this hiring was indeed for purposes related 
to preparing the firm to be acquired). Rumor accuracy and stock returns may thus be reliably 
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Unlike the aforementioned papers, we provide extensive controls for firm characteristics 
which have been commonly identified as determinants of takeover predictability (cf., Cornett et 
al., 2011), and appear to be the first paper to present bidder firm abnormal returns over the rumor 
date period. Furthermore, as we discuss in the following section, our data was meticulously 
collected in a manner which we believe is most likely to capture the initial takeover rumor, 
resulting in a sample size of 2,074 observations, approximately four to eight times the sample 
size of the abovementioned studies. 
Examining takeover rumors within the business press, our paper is unique in its manual 
deconstruction of the signals that prompted the publication of the article, and in demonstrating 
the linkages between these signals and the resulting market responses to rumored target and 
bidder firms. In so doing, we provide new evidence on the determinants of accuracy and 
abnormal firm returns as related to information credibility in the business press.  
I.  Data and Methodology 
This paper employs a market model approach in estimating firm abnormal returns4, as 
espoused by Campbell et al. (1997) and utilized in Aktas et al. (2004), Betton et al. (2014), and 
Chou et al. (2015), among others: 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + uit, 
where Rit and Rmt are the daily returns on stock i and the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio 
on day t, αi and βi are regression coefficients estimated over a 250 day period ending on day -43 
relative to the event date, and uit is a residual error term representing the abnormal return. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are subsequently formed by aggregating abnormal returns 
across firms and over time. 
                                                 
4 To ensure the robustness of our results, we also calculated market-adjusted CARs, as utilized by Ahern and 
Sosyura (2015), and employed these in our main analysis. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively very 
similar to our reported findings. The respective tables are not reported here for brevity, but are available from the 
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We define takeover rumors as any conjecture published within newspapers, newswires, 
business journals, and/or trade journals which expressly indicate that a public firm contained 
within the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database is clearly a potential target of 
an impending merger or acquisition. Specific sources thoroughly investigated include the 
databases of S&P Capital IQ, S&P Takeover Talk, and Zephyr, as well as the online services of 
Factiva and Pro-Quest (which themselves include thousands of newswires and printed 
communications, including the Wall Street Journal, the Economist, Bloomberg Businessweek, 
and Dow Jones Newswires, among many others). 
To uncover such rumors, we employ a proprietary algorithm by first investigating actual 
takeover rumors that are easily identifiable – those available in S&P Takeover Talk, S&P Capital 
IQ, and Zephyr. An initial sample of over 200 different takeover rumors thus provided the basis 
for developing an algorithm to search for additional takeover rumors contained within Factiva 
and Pro-Quest. The search algorithm contains terms such as “strategic alternative”, “buyout”, 
“sale of the firm”, “looking to be acquired”, “takeover candidate”, and “takeover chatter”, 
amongst others, in combination with Boolean logic and another set of terms such as merger, 
takeover, rumor, chatter, acqui*, etc. 
We then utilize this proprietary algorithm to find articles in both Factiva and in Pro-Quest 
news sources not overlapping with Factiva (such as the Financial Times, Barron’s, the Mergers 
& Acquisitions Report, etc.). Because the algorithm results in many false positives, we manually 
distinguish articles containing takeover rumors from those which do not. We then use a second 
streamlined algorithm incorporating the target firm’s name to identify any additional preceding 
rumors, stopping only when a clean window of at least 180 days was established. After 
aggregating results from all five databases investigated, we once again employ a Factiva search 
using our streamlined algorithm to ensure our clean window of 180 days is retained, losing many 
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Next, we code the rumor’s content according to which of sixteen potential takeover rumor 
rationales were provided within the scoop article, additionally noting whether either the potential 
bidder or target denied that negotiations were underway. Appendix A summarizes the variable 
definitions. Rumors are further categorized as speculative if based solely on either takeover 
chatter or an increase in the number of call options placed on the target firm, and as informative 
if based on three or more non-speculative rationales. The latter classification accounts for prior 
findings that suggest that message credibility increases when multiple signals are present 
(Kosfeld, 2005) and when the signals themselves are more verifiable (Peterson, 2004). 
Speculative rumors provide no underlying connection to an impending takeover – nothing in the 
article explains why the takeover chatter exists, or why an increase in call options is attributed to 
an impending takeover rather than to optimism regarding firm prospects. In contrast, every other 
rumor type provides specific reasoning within the article that links the rationale directly to future 
takeover activity; we therefore expect increased takeover anticipation and better accuracy rates in 
such cases. 
Finally, all rumor articles that reached this stage were re-read and their coding was verified 
by multiple researchers to ensure accuracy. To assist in determining associated announcement 
dates, we conducted a manual search of both Factiva and Google, correcting for 52 errors and 
143 omissions found within SDC. 
In sum, the utmost rigor was used to correctly identify and code the initial release of 
publicized takeover rumors from a wide variety of media sources, covering approximately 
30,000 individual business publications, newspapers, and newswires over the ten-year period 
from 2002 to 2011. This has resulted in the largest sample size of scoop takeover articles to date, 
containing 2,074 initial takeover rumors of target firms, 714 of which also mention a rumored 
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This rumor collection procedure contrasts to that taken by Ahern and Sosyura (2015) in a 
number of important ways: First, we believe that our sample is more likely to contain the initial 
('scoop') article. We note that Ahern and Sosyura use only the 33 largest domestic newspapers in 
Factiva for the first pass of rumor collection, frequently only searching backwards one week for 
a more recent rumor version. However, we find that takeover rumors involving the same target 
firm can occur from a variety of different sources during the prior 180 days. This is critical in 
determining a precise market response. Second, to preserve a clear distinction between rumors 
and takeover announcements, we exclude rumors which are confirmed by the target firm, or 
which provide details of a specific bid price. In contrast, Ahern and Sosyura include such 
articles, with 38.6% of their sample rumors providing the specific takeover price offered. Third, 
we conduct a manual search of both Factiva and Google, correcting the aforementioned errors 
and omissions found within SDC. Finally, as presented in Table 1, our sample size is 
substantially larger (2,074 observations, compared to 501) and quite different from that of Ahern 
and Sosyura’s: our rumored target firms are smaller in terms of size, Tobin’s Q, 
advertising/assets, and R&D to assets5, yet the aggregate market value of our sample (11.1 
trillion) compares favorably with theirs (having a lower bound of 6.6 trillion).  
II.  Results 
Summary statistics and univariate results 
Table 1, Panels A through C, presents summary statistics of rumored target firms. Overall, 
the number of scoop rumors trends upwards, with the years 2010 and 2011 resulting in more 
articles than the six years from 2002 to 2007. The accuracy rate indicates the percentage of initial 
rumor articles resulting in a formal takeover announcement within 365 days, and ranges from 
                                                 
5 This is likely a consequence of having a clean window of 180 days for every rumor: very large firms are rarely free 
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9.8% for rumors based on takeover chatter to 44.3% for rumors in which an insider is cited as the 
source of the rumor.  
On average, 20.9% of initial takeover rumors yield formal takeover announcements within 
one year, increasing to 27% within two years. In the short term, 9.8% (15%) of initial rumors 
result in announcements within 90 (180) days (untabulated). Additionally, we see that 
informative rumors come true 37.6% of the time, versus a rate of only 6.7% for speculative 
rumors. 
Cumulative abnormal returns in event time from 20 trading days before to 20 trading days 
after the rumor are presented in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 1. As shown in Panel A, overall 
rumor date (0, +1) CARs are 3.81% (p-value<0.001), while accurate and non-accurate rumors 
yield significantly positive rumor date CARs of 8.37% and 2.62%, respectively. The mean 
difference of 5.75% is significant at the 1% level, implying that investors are able to distinguish 
between accurate and non-accurate rumors on the rumor date6. This is true despite an average 
time to takeover announcement of 130.14 days for accurate rumors, and is consistent with the 
results of Ahern and Sosyura (2015).  
This ability to distinguish accuracy extends to many but not all rumor types, with ten of the 
sixteen rumor rationales having significant positive abnormal return differences between 
accurate and non-accurate rumors. Rumors denied by the target firm result in accurate and non-
accurate rumor date CARs of 1.74% (non-significant) and 9.48% (significant at the 5% level), 
respectively, with the difference of -7.84% significant at the 10% level. Stated differently, 
investors appear to disbelieve target firm denials more so when such denials are in fact correct, 
and this is the only rumor category for which non-accurate scoop rumors outperform accurate 
scoop rumors on the rumor date. 
                                                 
6 In unreported robustness checks, this significance level remains after removing rumors leading to takeovers within 
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Every rumor rationale except TargetDistress and UnusualActivity results, on average, in 
significant CARs over the rumor date (0, +1), with FinancingSource and SynergyCited impacting 
target firm returns the most, having rumor date CARs of 10.25% and 9.04%, respectively, each 
significant at the 1% level. Confirming our hypothesis that a demonstrable linkage to future 
takeover activity within the rumor affects takeover anticipation, we find rumor date CARs of 
6.18% (1.80%) for Informative (Speculative) rumors, respectively, a difference significant at the 
1% level in untabulated difference-in-mean analyses. 
During the runup period to the rumor (-20, -2), as presented in Panel B, initial rumors in 
aggregate are only associated with significant abnormal CARs (2.33%) when they later prove to 
be accurate, and such returns are significantly different from non-accurate rumor runup returns 
(p-value=0.012). Similarly, investors distinguish rumor accuracy when the hiring of a financial 
advisor (p-value=0.007) or an insider (p-value=0.066) is cited as the basis for the rumor, 
consistent with information leakage arising from individuals with intimate knowledge of 
potential takeover negotiations (Agarwal and Nassar, 2012). We find significantly positive CARs 
for rumors citing an insider (p-value=0.028), potential synergies (p-value=0.095), or based on 
unusual activity (p-value=0.089), and significantly negative CARs for rumors based on an 
increased number of call options on the target firm (p-value=0.010), undervaluation of the target 
firm (p-value=0.057), denial from the rumored bidder (p-value=0.098), or based on speculation 
(p-value=0.059). Such variation in runup period returns provides evidence that information 
leakage and/or the market’s ability to otherwise anticipate takeovers varies by underlying 
characteristics within the rumor article.  
During the post-rumor period, as shown in Panel C, we see that the market reverses its 
opinion of the average merger rumor only when it is indeed false7 (CAR=-0.79%; p-
value=0.089). Investors further demonstrate post-rumor aptitude by distinguishing between 
                                                 
7 In unreported robustness checks that we perform for comparison purposes, the market reverses its opinion of the 
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accurate and non-accurate rumors correctly when the underlying rumor rationale involves large 
share purchases (CAR=6.6%; p-value=0.078), private equity fund involvement (CAR=3.13%; p-
value=0.089), or target firm undervaluation (CAR=5.11%; p-value=0.093). We further find a 
strong market reversal for rumors based on takeover chatter (CAR=-2.66%; p-value<0.001), 
whereas we see evidence of rumor date underreaction for rumors based on the involvement of a 
private equity fund (CAR=1.75%; p-value=0.035).  
Panel D displays CARs over the (-20, +20) rumor period, demonstrating that in aggregate 
and for many rumor rationales, investors are, once again, able to distinguish between accurate 
and non-accurate rumors, with a significantly positive CAR differential of 11.03% (p-
value<0.001).  
In sum, our univariate results provide substantial evidence that firm returns differ 
according to rumor accuracy. However, such investor acumen is not evident with respect to all 
types of rumors, particularly when the target firm’s management denies the rumor. The 
importance of the underlying rumor rationale is further delineated by the variation in abnormal 
rumor date returns, ranging from 10.25% for rumors mentioning the potential source of financing 
to -0.72% for those indicating that the takeover stems from target firm distress. In addition, we 
show that rumors labelled Speculative provide significantly lower abnormal returns than those 
labelled Informative in each of the time periods examined. Indeed, informative rumors 
outperform speculative rumors by 3.56% (p-value=0.005) in the (+2, +20) post-rumor period, 
with investors having the opportunity to classify rumors and set their trading strategy on the 
rumor date. Overall, this evidence is consistent with investors interpreting the likelihood of a 
takeover differently based on the perceived quality of the signals identified in the initial rumor 
content. We next look for confirmation of our findings in a multivariate regression context. 












Page | 17 
We next examine whether stock price responses to target firm scoop rumors are associated 
with rumor content after controlling for alternative explanations. Following Ahern and Sosyura 
(2015), we use the following controls: news article fixed effects to account for the influence of 
the publication on investors’ belief in the rumor’s accuracy; the cumulative abnormal returns of 
the target in the five trading days prior to the rumor’s publication, CAR(-5, -1), to control for 
staleness and information leakage; an indicator of newsworthiness, ValuableBrand, to control for 
rumor sensationalism designed to generate audience attention; and an estimate of the eventual 
target firm announcement return if the rumor does indeed come true, EstAnnReturn, to control 
for investors’ potential reward.  
News article fixed effects are created using all media sources providing at least five scoop 
articles, while ValuableBrand is a dummy variable representing target firm inclusion in a list of 
the top 100 brands from the marketing consultancy firms Interbrand and BrandZ anytime 
between 2002 and 2011. EstAnnReturn is estimated from a linear regression of target 
announcement day returns on target size, industry, and year fixed effects in a sample of 2,342 
official merger announcements of public targets over the period from 2002 to 2011 as provided 
by the SDC database.  
Because investors may base their belief in rumor accuracy on underlying firm 
characteristics rather than on rumor details, we follow Cornett et al. (2011) who predict target 
firm takeover candidacy using variables which measure management’s motives to generate 
shareholder value, opportunistic benefits, or both. As mergers may be motivated by 
management’s desire to withstand economic disturbances, Salesshock is defined as the absolute 
value of the difference between the two-year median industry sales growth rate and the two-year 
median sales growth rate of all sample target firms (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). To account 
for convexity, we also use the square of sales shock (Salesshock sq). Changesize2y, the 
percentage change in the firm’s total assets over the previous two years, and Salesgrowth2y, the 
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economies of scale or scope (Gort, 1969, Palepu, 1986, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992, and 
Moeller et al., 2004). Concentration, the ratio of sales of the largest four firms to total three-digit 
SIC industry sales, measures barriers to entry and thus the need for mergers to survive (Gort, 
1969, Eckbo, 1992).  
Representing management motives to access new sources of capital, Resmismatch is a 
dummy variable equal to one if i) sales growth for a firm in the last two years is less than the 
industry median and the long-term debt ratio (the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to 
total assets) is greater than the industry median, or ii) if sales growth in the last two years is 
greater than the industry median and the long-term debt ratio is less than the industry median, 
and zero otherwise (Palepu, 1986, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). ROA, calculated as the ratio 
of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) items to total assets, represents firm 
profitability as a merger motive, while Shareturnover, the ratio of the number of shares of stock 
traded for the firm to total shares outstanding, proxies for discrepancies in valuation which can 
prompt mergers (Gort, 1969, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). Cashratio, the ratio of cash 
and marketable securities to marketable assets, accounts for the hypothesis that firms with more 
cash are more likely to propose bids (Harford, 1999, Harford et al., 2008) than receive them.  
With research indicating that firms with a history of mergers are more likely to receive 
additional bids (Schipper and Thompson, 1983, Asquith et al., 1983, Malatesta and Thomson, 
1985, Loderer and Martin, 1990, Holmes and Schmit, 1995, Fuller et al., 2002, and Ismail, 
2005), Prevmergers counts the number of times a firm proposes or receives a merger bid in the 
prior two years. Dormancy, the number of months since the last merger in the same three-digit 
SIC industry, represents merger intensity, with low values indicating a greater likelihood for the 
target to participate in the merger wave (Song and Walkling, 2000, 2011). Priorreturn2y and 
Infoasymm measure management’s motives to exploit its information advantage when markets 
misprice firm value (Hansen, 1987, Schwert, 1996, and Betton et al., 2008). Priorreturn2y is the 
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dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s stock price is both overvalued (with a market-to-book 
value greater than the industry median) and opaque (share turnover is lower than the industry 
median). Finally, we also control for the cumulative abnormal returns of the target 41 trading 
days prior to the rumor’s publication as Chou et al. (2015) find this to be a determinant of future 
takeover announcements. 
Table 3 presents target firm CARs over the (0, +1) rumor date period, using rumor 
characteristics as explanatory variables while controlling for industry, news, and year fixed 
effects, as well as firm fixed effects in Models 1, 3, and 48. In Model 1, we find evidence of 
significantly positive CARs for rumors which indicate a financial advisor has been hired (p-
value=0.009), incorporate the name of the potential bidder (p-value<0.001), or cite an insider as 
the source of the rumor (p-value=0.028). In contrast, we find evidence of significantly negative 
CARs in rumors based on analyst opinions (p-value=0.082) and target firm distress (p-
value=0.005), indicating a stark disparity in investor responses related to the underlying 
rationale. 
In untabulated results, we see some support for ROA (p-value=0.035) and Salesshock (p-
value=0.088) positively influencing rumor date returns, and Prevmergers negatively influencing 
them (p-value=0.078). Additionally, we examine the news article fixed effects and find the 
Associated Press, Reuters Newswires, and the Wall Street Journal having significantly positive 
CARs of 0.027 (p-value=0.065), 0.029 (p-value<0.001), and 0.019 (p-value=0.054), respectively, 
while Businessweek has significantly negative CARs of -0.020 (p-value=0.028).  
In Model 2 we again categorize rumor content into Informative and Speculative rationales, 
expecting rumors which provide multiple direct linkages to future takeover activity to 
outperform those based on tenuous linkages. Indeed, this proves to be the case, with Informative 
CARs significantly positive and Speculative CARs significantly negative, at the 1% and 5% 
                                                 
8 Note that because EstAnnReturn is estimated using firm size, industry, and year fixed effects, these variables are 
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level, respectively. Moreover, these variables maintain their significance in Models 3 and 4 when 
further control variables are added. Model 4 includes the accuracy of the rumor, which is 
positively significant at the 1% level and confirms our univariate results that suggest that 
accuracy is, at least in part, identified by investors on the rumor date.   
It is conceivable that over the rumor period, other takeover signals exist which we are 
unaware of yet which drive the rumor date returns. As this is more likely the case when 
takeovers are imminent, we perform a robustness test in which we remove 75 observations in 
which the announcement is forthcoming within the next 14 days. The results (unreported for 
brevity) remain qualitatively unchanged except for AnalystReport (p-value=0.181) which loses 
its significance in Model 1 and Speculative (p-value=0.053) which drops in significance in 
Model 4.  
In sum, we interpret our results over the (0, +1) initial rumor date period as consistent with 
investors treating initial takeover rumors differently dependant on the rumor content, particularly 
when rumors indicate that a financial advisor was hired, when they mention a potential bidder, 
cite an insider, or indicate target firm distress. With the exception of ROA and Salesshock, 
investors appear to value rumor content takeover signals on the rumor date over controls derived 
from the literature – that is, variables related to management motives for a takeover, firm 
newsworthiness as indicated by brand value, and the estimated announcement return. In addition, 
investors appear to disbelieve rumors which do not provide a definite linkage to the rationale for 
the takeover, yet believe those that provide multiple such linkages. Investor perceptions are often 
correct, with abnormal returns on accurate rumors significantly higher than those on inaccurate 
rumors. Any trading strategy predicated on takeover rumors may therefore be spurious if the 
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Accuracy  
We next employ a series of logistic regressions to predict which rumors result in a takeover 
announcement within 365 calendar days after the initial scoop article9. To control for investor 
takeover expectations, we use either rumor date returns or EstDealLikelihood. This latter variable 
represents the estimated probability that the deal comes true and is derived from acknowledging 
that the rumor date return (R0) has two components: the probability the rumor comes true (𝑝), 
and the expected announcement return of the target firm if it does come true (Ra). Rearranging 
the expression as p = R0 / Ra allows us to estimate p using rumor date returns and our previous 
estimate of target announcement date returns, EstAnnReturn (Bhagat et al., 2005, Ahern and 
Sosyura, 2015).  
Model 1 in Panel A of Table 4 shows that many rumor rationales are significantly positive 
predictors of subsequent takeovers, with AdvisorHired, BidderMentioned, InsiderCited, 
MgmtConcerns, SynergyCited, TargetDistress, TargetInitiated, and UnusualActivity all 
significant at the 5% level or better. The results scarcely differ in Model 2 in which 
EstDealLikelihood, the component of rumor date returns related to the accuracy of the rumor, is 
used as an independent variable in place of the rumor date returns, itself significant at the 1% 
level. Models 3 and 4 present results for categories of rumors, in which we show that Informative 
rumors are significantly positive predictors, while Speculative rumors are significantly negative 
predictors of takeover likelihood, at the 5% level or better in each model. In untabulated results 
of news article fixed effects in Model 1, only the Associated Press, the Financial Wire, and Street 
Insider are significant predictors, having coefficients of 0.731 (p-value=0.005), 1.278 (p-
value=0.016), and 0.659 (p-value=0.060), respectively. 
                                                 
9 Our findings are qualitatively similar when we use 180 days or two years instead. The respective results are 
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Consistent with Ahern and Sosyura (2015), we find that the rumor date return, CAR(0, +1), 
is the most economically significant predictor of future target firm takeover activity10, while 
rumors involving noteworthy firms, ValuableBrand, are significantly less likely to be true, 
supporting the notion of rumor generation for the purpose of attracting readership. Additionally, 
our results concur with Palepu (1986) and others who find that target firm size is a negative 
predictor of takeover activity, as various transaction costs associated with the absorption of the 
target firm into the acquirer increase with the size of the target firm. In untabulated results we 
find a significantly negative coefficient on Shareturnover (p-value=0.008), contrasting with Gort 
(1969), and Cornett et al. (2011), who surmise that increasing discrepancies of opinion should 
lead to more mergers. Likewise, rather than reallocating resources to withstand economic 
disturbances as the literature suggests (Gort, 1969, Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996, Maksimovic 
and Phillips, 2001, and Andrade et al., 2001), we find a significantly negative coefficient on 
SalesShock (p-value=0.005), although this latter result is no longer significant when we examine 
predictors of takeover announcements that are beneficial for target firms, discussed 
subsequently. 
We perform robustness checks by considering a subsample of rumors in which we remove 
75 observations in which the announcement is forthcoming within the next 14 days, as done 
earlier for Table 3. Again, the results (unreported) are qualitatively similar, with notable 
differences including BidderMentioned losing significance in both Models 1 and 2, while both 
TargetInitiated and Undervalued increase in significance (from the 10% to the 5% level) in 
Model 2. 
One subtlety associated with predicting takeover announcements is the common 
assumption that target firms experience positive CARs on the announcement date; however, this 
is not always the case, with only 53.7 % of our accurate rumors leading to positive target firm 
CARs over the (-41, +2) announcement day period. For comparison purposes, it is thus 
                                                 












Page | 23 
interesting to see how well rumor variables predict such ‘beneficial’ takeover announcements, as 
presented in Panel B of Table 4. While most results are qualitatively similar to Panel A, 
throughout Models 1 - 2 BidderMentioned, TargetDistress, TargetInitiated, and Undervalued are 
no longer significant, implying that takeover announcements arising from such rumors are either 
predicted well in advance of the announcement date, or not interpreted by investors as good news 
for the target firm. This latter viewpoint is supported by Masulis and Simsir (2017) and Davis, 
Walker, and Zhou (2017), who find that targets initiating takeover negotiations or experiencing 
distress perform poorly on the takeover announcement date. 
Prior five-day returns and 41-day returns are now statistically significant predictors at the 
5% and 1% level, respectively, in each model employed. This implies that some investors are not 
only aware of the impending rumor, but also that they are able to distinguish between rumors 
that are ultimately beneficial for the target firm versus those which are not. In unreported results, 
we confirm this by performing a two-sample t-test using unequal variances, finding that prior 
five-day (41-day) returns are 4.34% (7.44%) higher for rumors leading to positive 
announcements than for rumors leading to non-positive announcements.  
We also find that rumors that are denied by the target firm are useful in predicting 
beneficial announcements, but not announcements overall11. In untabulated results of news 
article fixed effects in Model 1, only the Associated Press is significant at the 5% level or better, 
having a coefficient of 0.960 (p-value=0.002).  
In sum, our logistic regressions confirm that while most takeover rumors should not be 
believed, some rumor types are positive predictors of future takeover announcements, even in the 
presence of takeover predictability control variables and including year, industry, and news 
article fixed effects. In particular, we find that AdvisorHired, InsiderCited, MgmtConcerns, 
UnusualActivity and Informative rumors are consistently significant positive predictors, while 
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Speculative rumors are significant negative predictors, results which are robust to considering 
only ‘beneficial’ announcements and, in untabulated analyses, to removing observations which 
represent imminent announcements (those occurring within the next 21 days). 
Our empirical evidence thus supports our central premises: the underlying rationale of the 
takeover rumor is an important predictor of rumor accuracy, with rumors combining multiple 
demonstrable linkages to future takeover activity being positive predictors of takeover 
announcements, and rumors providing only tenuous linkages being negative such predictors. 
This suggests that message justification should be of interest to both academics and practitioners 
in predicting future takeover activity.  
Trading strategies 
We form long-short portfolios of target firms in Table 5. The first row, labelled Rumor 
Characteristics, presents results based on the predicted accuracy of the rumor using the empirical 
models presented in Column 1 of Panel A in Table 4 (long target firms with significantly 
accurate rumor rationales, short those with no significant predictive power, excluding those with 
non-mutually exclusive rumor rationales), while the second row, labelled Rumor 
Informativeness, presents results based on the nature of the rumor’s linkage to future takeover 
activity (long target firms with Informative rumor rationales, short target firms with Speculative 
rumor rationales). The first day a firm can be placed in a portfolio is day 2 after an initial rumor 
is published, and firms are held in the portfolio for up to one year after the rumor date, with daily 
portfolio rebalancing using equal weights.  
Not accounting for transaction costs, we find economically and statistically significant 
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fully account for all available information provided on the rumor date12. Such long-run abnormal 
returns imply a lack of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); to confirm, we follow Ahern and 
Sosyura (2015) and partition our sample according to above- and below-median subsamples 
based on Amihud illiquidity, a proxy for the cost of arbitrage, and on a widely-used measure of 
liquidity, the proportional bid-ask spread. Indeed, we find excess returns to be significant 
primarily (although not exclusively) in the illiquid portfolio subsamples, confirming the 
supposition that limits to arbitrage are impeding market efficiency. 
In sum, there appears ample evidence that post-rumor abnormal returns differ according to 
rumor content as presented in the initial scoop article. Rumors providing multiple substantive 
takeover rationales result in significantly positive abnormal returns, in direct contrast to rumors 
based solely on unsubstantiated takeover chatter or on increased purchases of call options. This 
finding is robust when considering a wide variety of time periods and methodologies in 
calculating abnormal returns. It appears that investors distinguish amongst rumor rationales with 
regards to their anticipatory ability and overall expected economic impact on the firm, and that 
multiple informative signals are deemed more credible and result in higher post-rumor returns 
than unsubstantiated rumors. Such findings suggest that forming a portfolio of rumored takeover 
targets without regard to implicit takeover rationales is inefficient – filling a gap in the extant 
literature which fails to identify the rationales provided for the rumors’ existence, and 
predominately treats all rumors equally.  
Multivariate returns of rumored bidder firms  
Within our dataset of 2,074 initial articles on target firms rumored to be takeover targets, 
895 specifically mention a potential bidder’s name. Of these, 155 mention a second potential 
bidder’s name and of these, 28 indicate a third potential bidder. However, many of these are not 
                                                 
12 Note that the Rumor Characteristics portfolio is not an implementable trading strategy as its formation requires 
future information unavailable to an investor, while the Rumor Informativeness portfolio is implementable based on 
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publicly listed companies, and after matching data to CRSP (Compustat) we are left with 714 
(568) rumored bidder observations, for which the average rumor date (0, +1) CAR is a non-
significant negative 0.031% (p-value=0.806). As all observations in this subsample mention a 
potential bidder, the ‘speculative’ category of rumors is non-existent. 
To aid our analysis, we construct the rumored bidder’s estimated announcement return in a 
manner similar to that of the target’s estimated announcement return. Specifically, we regress 
bidder announcement day returns on bidder size, industry, and year fixed effects in a sample of 
2,342 official merger announcements as provided by the SDC database over the period from 
2002 to 2011. We use the coefficients from this model to fit estimates of the announcement date 
bidder return (EstAnnReturn_B) for each rumored bidder return in our subsample13.  
We present results for a multivariate analysis of rumored bidder firm cumulative abnormal 
returns over various rumor date periods in Table 6, with Model 1 presenting results over the (-20, 
-2) pre-rumor period. Here we see that SynergyCited is significantly positively associated with 
CARs at the 5% level, consistent with capturing synergies as a motive for acquisitions (e.g., 
Bradley et al., 1988; Rohdes-Kropf et al., 2005). It is unclear why BlockPurchase and 
TakeoverChatter are also significantly positively associated with CARs at the 5% level. If 
rumored bidding firms are the ones purchasing the block of target shares, the former result may 
reflect the benefits such toeholds can provide to acquirers (Betton et al., 2009), while takeover 
chatter may be specifically generated by those enthusiastically desiring takeovers deemed 
desirable for the bidding firm; however, these suppositions merit further investigation.  
Examining rumor date period (0, +1) CARs in Model 2, we find that rumors indicating 
target firm distress result in significantly positive bidder firm returns at the 5% level. Positive 
target sales shocks, Salesshock, have a significantly negative correlation with bidder returns, 
while the largest economic impact to bidder rumor date returns occurs when the target firm has 
                                                 
13 Note that because EstAnnReturn_B is estimated using firm size, industry, and year fixed effects, these variables 
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experienced a large sales shock, SalesshockSq, (CAR=0.12; p-value=0.012). Taken together, this 
implies that rumored bidders of distressed firms tend to do well on the rumor date, supporting the 
proposition that bidders perform well when acquiring targets in distress (Masulis and Simsir, 
2017; Davis et al., 2017). Additionally, we find significantly positive returns when the rumor 
mentions private equity firm involvement (CAR=0.014; p-value=0.024), which may indicate an 
investor belief that such professional industry involvement provides a signal that the potential 
acquisition is in the best interest of acquiring firm shareholders.  
The significantly negative association between rumor date returns and FinancingSource 
may indicate that investors oppose the rumored method of financing the potential deal, or 
perhaps that investors oppose the takeover regardless of financing while deeming such a rumor 
type as a credible takeover indicator; alternatively, our results may simply reflect the effects of a 
strategy which shorts potential bidders who use stock as a method of consideration (Mitchell et 
al., 2004).  
We note that significantly positive CARs for various categories of takeovers surrounding 
the rumor period corroborate the contention of Cai et al. (2011) that bidder announcement period 
returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding. 
Rumor effect on premiums 
Much research finds a significant target firm share appreciation ('runup') prior to takeover 
bid announcements (Betton et al., 2008). From an efficient markets perspective, the runup 
reflects actual changes in firm value and thus impending takeover bids should rise equivalently 
(the markup pricing hypothesis). An alternate point of view is that the runup merely reflects the 
market’s anticipation of an impending takeover bid, and thus bids should be independent of such 
changes in share price (the substitution hypothesis14).  
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Within this context, both Ahern and Sosyura (2015) and Chou et al. (2015) analyze 167 
and 85 announcement premiums of rumored targets, respectively, defining the premium as the 
cumulative abnormal return of a period which combines both the runup window of (-42, -1) with 
a subsequent 'markup' period as per Schwert (1996). While each paper finds that rumors 
positively impact the runup, Chou et al. find that rumors positively affect the total premium paid, 
while Ahern and Sosyura find no contribution at all due to the negative impact rumors have on 
the markup. 
We perform a similar analysis, combining a sample of 433 takeover announcements of 
rumored targets together with the full sample of official SDC merger bids for public U.S. targets 
announced in 2002-2011 seeking a change in majority ownership. With day 0 representing the 
takeover announcement date, we define the runup as the CAR over the (-42, -1) period, the 
markup as the CAR over the (0, 5) period, and consequently the premium as the CAR over the (-
42, +5) period, in a manner identical to Ahern and Sosyura15. For robustness, we additionally 
compute the premium as the final offer price recorded in SDC compared to the price 42 days 
prior, truncating values at -100% and 200%, with missing premiums approximated using the (-
42, +1) announcement return, in a manner similar to Officer (2003) and Jenter and Lewellen 
(2015), among others. Most control variables are consistent with Ahern and Sosyura (2015)16, 
while acquirer and target termination fees, the acquirer’s public status, deal attitude, and the 
return on assets are motivated by Officer (2003), Betton et al. (2008), Moeller et al. (2003), and 
Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014), respectively. 
Models 1–3 of Table 7, Panel A, display OLS regression results for the runup, markup, and 
combined premium periods, respectively. Contrary to prior studies, rumors are not found to 
                                                 
15 While this markup window is shorter than that examined by Chou et al. (2015) and Schwert (1996), Ahern and 
Sosyura (2015) note that the vast majority of returns occur within the first few days after the bid announcement, and 
Betton et al. (2014) also prefer shorter markup windows to minimize the effect of subsequent events..  
16 We exclude firm-level controls of advertising/assets, industry sales to households, and R&D/assets to maximize 
the size of the sample without making assumptions for missing data. Additionally, such variables are not typically 
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significantly affect the runup period as defined by a (-42, -1) window, while negatively affecting 
the markup in accordance with Ahern and Sosyura (2015). The net result is a negative impact on 
the (-42, +5) premium, significant at the 1% level and contrasting with the significantly positive 
effect of rumors found by Chou et al. (2015) and the lack of rumor effects by Ahern and Sosyura 
(2015). This negative association between rumors and premiums is robust to both an alternative 
definition of premium and to additional controls, as evidenced in Models 4–6. 
However, the average (median) time to takeover announcement is 130.14 (98) days for 
accurate initial rumors in our sample. We surmise that combining rumor sources from five 
different databases has resulted in a high degree of precision in determining the initial rumor 
date, and thus it appears appropriate to consider an extended runup period, despite convention on 
this issue.  Indeed, we find that rumors are significant in determining the runup once we increase 
the length of this period to (-120, -1) in Model 7. Consequently, we find the premium to be 
unaffected by rumors in Model 8, supporting the notion that acquirers adjust bids to avoid the 
impact of rumors as in Ahern and Sosyura (2015). In untabulated results, this finding holds when 
the additional controls in Models 5 and 6 are included, when the premium is instead defined as 
SDC’s final offer price compared to the price 120 days prior, and even when the length of the 
runup is changed from 120 to 180 days, although in this case the p-value for the rumor effect on 
the runup is 0.058. 
In Panel B, we dissect rumors by article rationale, presenting significant findings on rumor 
types within the table. Our full results with insignificant rumor characteristics are omitted for 
brevity but are available upon request. As shown in Models 1 and 2, the abnormal returns in the 
runup period are typically offset by opposing abnormal returns in the markup period, resulting in 
an insignificant effect on the premium in Model 3. However, we find two exceptions: the first is 
when insiders are cited as the cause of the rumor, resulting in a significantly positive premium of 
18.2% (p-value=0.023), and the second is when targets themselves initiate the rumor, resulting in 
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the negative merger outcomes of target-initiated deals as identified by Aktas et al. (2010), Davis 
et al. (2017), and Masulis and Simsir (2017), and robust to using SDC’s final offer price as the 
definition of a premium in Model 4 (p-value=0.001). The former result is novel, representing the 
only rumor type for which bidders do not appear to sufficiently adjust their bid to account for the 
rumor runup effect. This finding remains significant at the 5% level when using the alternate 
premium definition. Perhaps insiders seek to generate interest in the target firm when they 
believe that the market’s re-evaluation of the firm’s value will increase (independent of the 
takeover effect), or perhaps insiders are attempting to manipulate bids for their personal 
advantage. However, this is merely speculative, and the issue merits further investigation. 
III.  Conclusions 
This paper employs a hand-collected dataset of initial ("scoop") takeover rumors, derived 
from a wide variety of public sources and databases including Capital IQ, Factiva, ProQuest, 
S&P Takeover Talk, and Zephyr to examine the predictive power of different types of takeover 
rumors in forecasting actual takeovers.  Through a search of approximately 30,000 newspapers, 
business periodicals, and newswires, we identify 2,074 first-instances of takeover rumors from 
2002 to 2011. We find evidence that takeover announcements are anticipated, with accurate 
rumors strongly outperforming inaccurate rumors, both on and to a lesser degree prior to the 
rumor date, and that rumor date returns vary according to various rumor content characteristics.  
When performing logistic regressions to predict the likelihood of post-rumor takeover 
announcements, we find that, in aggregate, rumors are negative predictors. That is, most rumors 
are false, in accordance with the literature. However, once rumors are classified by content, we 
find many rumor types to be significant positive predictors of impending takeovers, a finding 
that is robust to the inclusion of anticipatory controls and alternate definitions of accuracy. We 
find evidence that certain rumor types (those in which a financial advisor was hired by the target, 
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or suspicious behavior was noted) are reliable predictors of both takeovers in general as well as 
‘beneficial’ takeovers (those yielding positive announcement period returns for target firms).  
When we group rumors into those we deem ex-ante to be informative (because they 
contain three or more rumor rationales demonstrably linked to future takeover activity rather 
than based on unsubstantiated takeover chatter or an increase in call options placed on the target 
firm), we find that such rumors provide significantly positive rumor date (0, +1) returns. 
Similarly, these rumors are predictive of impending takeovers (both in general and of ‘beneficial’ 
ones), with findings robust to a variety of measures. When we group rumors into those we deem 
ex-ante speculative (based only on takeover chatter or investors’ positions in call options), we 
find the opposite – significantly negative returns over the rumor date and over the long-run, and 
having a negative predictive ability for both general and ‘beneficial’ takeover announcements. 
Most telling, the monthly returns for an equally-weighted portfolio which is long on target firms 
subject to Informative rumors while short on target firms subject to Speculative rumors average 
around 1% over the one year post-rumor period, significant at the 1% level, with highly illiquid 
stocks driving results and thus appearing to limit arbitrage.  
Interestingly, we enter the debate on rumor premium effects by concluding that the length 
of the runup period employed is critical; in our sample, many initial rumors occur prior to the 
standard (-41,-1) runup period, and their positive influence on the premium is thus ignored if this 
period is not extended. We also conclude that the premium may be affected by individual rumor 
rationales, with insiders cited within the rumor being associated with positive premiums, and the 
target firm initiating the rumor associated with negative premiums. 
We interpret this evidence as supportive of our hypothesis that the underlying rationale 
justifying the release of public information has differential effects on firm share prices and 
predictability. In this way, we contribute to the literature on financial content analysis, share 
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(1952:147) notes that: “Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Particular studies have 
been productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of rumored target firms 
This table presents summary statistics of rumor articles by rumor characteristics which are not mutually-exclusive and are derived 
from the initial (‘scoop’) reporting article. Advertising/Assets and R&D/Assets are as defined in Ahern and Sosyura (2015). Due to a 
large number of missing observations for these variables, they are not included in our subsequent analysis. Counts of rumor articles 
are displayed by time periods. Accuracy rate indicates the percentage of scoop articles in which a formal takeover bid is made for the 
target firm within one year, as indicated in either the SDC database or from a manual verification via the Factiva database. Target size 
represents the natural log of assets as per the most recent quarter prior to the rumor date. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Rumored target firm attributes 
Variable N Mean Median Variable N Mean Median 
Advertising/Assets (%)  922  0.037 0.014 Resmismatch 1800  0.510 1.000 
Cashratio  1888  0.227 0.143 ROA   1886 -0.007 0.009 
Changesize2y  1830  0.290 0.119 Salesgrowth2y   1823  0.373 0.131 
Concentration  1901  0.563 0.533 Salesshock 1899  0.115 0.079 
Dormancy  2074  2.633 0.100 SalesshockSq 1899  0.019 0.006 
Infoasymm  1845  0.061 0.000 Shareturnover   1867  0.617 0.741 
Prevmergers 2074  0.988 0.000 Size 1899  7.362 7.556 
Priorreturn2y 1980  0.370 0.016 Tobin's Q 1899  1.006 1.000 
R&D/Assets (%) 1295  0.099 0.055 Valuable Brand (%) 2074 14.513 0.000 
 















  Fama-French 17 
Industry Classification 
N 
AdvisorHired 111 66 62 239 5.86 41.8   Food 71 
AnalystReport 270 147 200 617 7.65 16.5   Mining & Minerals 69 
BidderMentioned 397 239 259 895 7.72 26.3   Oil & Petroleum 161 
BlockPurchase 32 16 21 69 7.19 27.5   Textiles, Apparel, Footware 33 
FinancingSource 15 12 12 39 7.61 41.0   Consumer Durables 28 
IndustryActivity 119 73 66 258 7.79 21.3   Chemicals 32 
InsiderCited 140 60 91 291 7.70 44.3   Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 140 
MgmtConcerns 29 9 11 49 7.27 40.8   Construction & Constr. Materials 50 
OptionsIncreased 62 137 286 485 7.86 9.9   Steel Works, Etc. 58 
PEFundInvolved 125 42 81 248 7.80 32.7   Fabricated Products 1 
SynergyCited 36 24 24 84 7.59 44.0   Machinery & Business Equipment 263 
TakeoverChatter 62 172 335 569 7.65 9.8   Automobiles 24 
TargetDistress 59 27 6 92 6.70 38.0   Transportation 66 
TargetInitiated 183 104 75 362 5.72 33.7   Utilities 8 
Undervalued 148 107 121 376 7.69 19.9   Retail Stores 176 
UnusualActivity 18 9 13 40 7.86 30.0   Banks, Ins. Firms, & Financials 36 
BidderDenied 16 7 3 26 8.96 30.8   Other (Services, Wholesale, etc.) 858 
TargetDenied 7 6 1 14 8.88 42.9     
Informative 281 124 132 537 7.51 37.6     
Speculative 10 85 249 344 7.63 6.7     
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Table 2: Rumored target abnormal event returns 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for firms rumored to be targets. The abnormal returns are market 
model value-weighted returns and are reported in percentages. Rumors that came true are those in which an official takeover 
announcement was made within one year of the first report of the rumor in the press. Panel A reports CAARs during a (0,+1) window 
immediately surrounding the rumor date (day 0). Panel B reports CAARs during the runup period (-20,-2), while Panel C focuses on 
the post-rumor period (+2,+20). Panel D reports CAARs over the whole event period (-20,+20). The results of a difference of means t-
test (based on true rumor CAARs vs. false rumor CAARs) are presented in the final column. P-values based on clustered standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  Rumor came true  
 All Yes No Difference 
Panel A: Rumor publication date CAARs (0,+1) 
All 3.81***   (0.000) 8.37***   (0.000) 2.62***   (0.000) 5.75***   (0.000) 
AdvisorHired 5.92***     (0.000) 9.45***   (0.000) 3.38***   (0.006) 6.07***   (0.000) 
AnalystReport 3.10***   (0.000) 7.30**    (0.011) 2.26***   (0.000) 5.04*      (0.079) 
BidderMentioned 5.75***   (0.000) 10.99***   (0.000) 3.94***   (0.000) 7.05***   (0.000) 
BlockPurchase 7.49***     (0.007) 15.17       (0.104) 4.49***   (0.001) 10.68       (0.246) 
FinancingSource 10.25***   (0.011) 15.98*      (0.080) 6.09***   (0.017) 9.90       (0.278) 
IndustryActivity 4.22***   (0.000) 6.35***   (0.000) 3.66***   (0.000) 2.69**     (0.025) 
InsiderCited 7.33***   (0.000) 10.53***   (0.000) 4.90***   (0.000) 5.63***   (0.000) 
MgmtConcerns 5.24***     (0.001) 6.39***   (0.003) 4.45*      (0.059) 1.94       (0.509) 
OptionsIncreased 2.68***   (0.000) 5.11***   (0.000) 2.42***   (0.000) 2.69***   (0.003) 
PEFundInvolved 6.26***   (0.000) 11.18***   (0.000) 3.89***   (0.000) 7.29***   (0.001) 
SynergyCited 9.04***     (0.017) 16.01*      (0.067) 4.04***   (0.018) 11.98       (0.174) 
TakeoverChatter 2.73***   (0.000) 5.15***   (0.000) 2.47***   (0.000) 2.69*      (0.055) 
TargetDistress -0.72       (0.769) 2.57       (0.613) -2.77       (0.258) 5.34       (0.174) 
TargetInitiated 3.07***   (0.000) 7.40***   (0.000) 0.86        (0.451) 6.53***   (0.000) 
Undervalued 3.70***   (0.000) 6.17***   (0.000) 3.09***   (0.000) 3.70***   (0.001) 
UnusualActivity 1.49       (0.529) 1.61       (0.821) 1.43       (0.331) 0.18       (0.981) 
BidderDenied 1.79       (0.218) 5.32       (0.134) 0.12       (0.930) 5.21       (0.158) 
TargetDenied 6.31**     (0.020) 1.74       (0.489) 9.48**     (0.023) -7.84*      (0.067) 
Informative 6.18***   (0.000) 10.23***   (0.000) 3.78***   (0.000) 6.45***   (0.001) 
Speculative 1.80***     (0.000) 3.63       (0.145) 1.67***     (0.000) 1.96       (0.424) 
 
Panel B: Runup period CAARs (-20,-2) 
All -0.04       (0.930) 2.33**    (0.034) -0.65       (0.151) 2.98**     (0.012) 
AdvisorHired 0.71       (0.684) 6.28**    (0.024) -3.31       (0.131) 9.58***   (0.007) 
AnalystReport 0.25       (0.677) 2.53       (0.214) -0.21       (0.725) 2.73       (0.197) 
BidderMentioned 0.34       (0.545) 1.27       (0.307) 0.02       (0.971) 1.25       (0.371) 
BlockPurchase 1.50       (0.477) -1.49        (0.645) 2.67       (0.316) -4.16       (0.319) 
FinancingSource 0.05       (0.982) -1.00        (0.742) 0.81       (0.771) -1.81       (0.658) 
IndustryActivity 1.76       (0.109) 2.84       (0.486) 1.49       (0.106) 1.35       (0.746) 
InsiderCited 2.32**    (0.028) 4.59**    (0.011) 0.59       (0.639) 4.01*       (0.066) 
MgmtConcerns 0.64       (0.785) 0.81       (0.409) 0.53       (0.870) 0.29       (0.952) 
OptionsIncreased -2.02***    (0.010) -3.53        (0.136) -1.85**     (0.025) -1.67        (0.500) 
PEFundInvolved 1.05       (0.235) 1.32       (0.399) 0.93       (0.392) 0.39       (0.834) 
SynergyCited 4.19*      (0.095) 8.54       (0.105) 1.06       (0.611) 7.48       (0.183) 
TakeoverChatter -1.21        (0.130) -1.53        (0.633) -1.17        (0.150) 0.36       (0.913) 
TargetDistress -0.12        (0.971) 3.76       (0.493) -2.48        (0.532) 6.24       (0.355) 
TargetInitiated 0.31       (0.835) 2.83       (0.258) -0.98        (0.592) 3.82       (0.219) 
Undervalued -1.79*      (0.057) -1.90        (0.395) -1.76*      (0.089) 0.14       (0.954) 
UnusualActivity 7.32*      (0.089) 19.12       (0.146) 1.87       (0.356) 17.25       (0.190) 
BidderDenied -8.35*      (0.098) -23.75      (0.161) -2.00       (0.378) -21.74      (0.195) 
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Informative 0.40       (0.636) 2.19      (0.184) -0.65       (0.484) 2.84       (0.133) 
Speculative -1.83*      (0.059) -0.38      (0.935) -1.93**    (0.050) 1.55       (0.747) 
 
Panel C: Post-rumor period CAARs (+2,+20) 
All -0.45       (0.285) 0.87      (0.378) -0.79*      (0.089) 1.66      (0.127) 
AdvisorHired 1.47       (0.493) 2.09      (0.373) 1.02       (0.757) 1.07      (0.791) 
AnalystReport 0.23       (0.688) 1.77      (0.241) -0.08       (0.891) 1.86      (0.254) 
BidderMentioned -0.12       (0.841) 0.08      (0.947) -0.20       (0.785) 0.28      (0.847) 
BlockPurchase 0.71       (0.613) 5.45      (0.117) -1.15       (0.412) 6.60*     (0.078) 
FinancingSource -1.07       (0.578) -1.35      (0.679) -0.87       (0.721) -0.47      (0.907) 
IndustryActivity -0.37       (0.706) -1.86      (0.531) 0.02       (0.985) 1.88      (0.548) 
InsiderCited 0.39       (0.713) 1.72      (0.359) -0.62       (0.618) 2.34      (0.298) 
MgmtConcerns -1.23       (0.641) 1.47      (0.767) -3.06       (0.307) 4.53      (0.432) 
OptionsIncreased -1.78       (0.011) 0.58      (0.771) -2.04***   (0.006) 2.62      (0.217) 
PEFundInvolved 1.75**    (0.035) 3.86**   (0.015) 0.73       (0.448) 3.13*     (0.089) 
SynergyCited -1.72       (0.232) -2.37      (0.381) -1.24       (0.424) -1.12      (0.716) 
TakeoverChatter -2.66***   (0.000) -3.11      (0.248) -2.61***   (0.000) -0.50      (0.858) 
TargetDistress 1.67       (0.621) -4.51      (0.356) 5.51       (0.226) -10.02      (0.132) 
TargetInitiated 1.49       (0.383) 1.58      (0.519) 1.44       (0.524) 0.14      (0.967) 
Undervalued -0.89       (0.338) 3.21      (0.267) -1.91**    (0.036) 5.11*     (0.093) 
UnusualActivity -0.72       (0.761) 0.44      (0.946) -1.26       (0.533) 1.69      (0.800) 
BidderDenied -9.91**    (0.044) -23.21     (0.121) -3.66       (0.106) -19.55      (0.182) 
TargetDenied -0.35       (0.939) -7.58      (0.253) 4.81       (0.458) -12.39     (0.162) 
Informative 0.77       (0.428) 1.01      (0.520) 0.62       (0.612) 0.38     (0.847) 
Speculative -2.79***   (0.000) -3.30      (0.145) -2.76***   (0.001) -0.54     (0.820) 
 
Panel D: Complete period CAARs (-20,+20) 
All 3.95***  (0.000) 12.71***  (0.000) 1.68**     (0.026) 11.03***  (0.000) 
AdvisorHired 9.01***  (0.002) 19.21***  (0.000) 1.67        (0.664) 17.54***  (0.001) 
AnalystReport 4.06***  (0.000) 13.51***  (0.009) 2.19**     (0.023) 11.32***  (0.006) 
BidderMentioned 7.15***  (0.000) 13.96***  (0.000) 4.79***    (0.000) 9.17***  (0.001) 
BlockPurchase 11.26***  (0.002) 19.81***  (0.010) 7.91**     (0.046) 11.90      (0.139) 
FinancingSource 15.20***  (0.004) 15.42**   (0.026) 15.04**    (0.050) 0.38       (0.969) 
Industry Activity 6.48***  (0.000) 8.30      (0.115) 6.01***   (0.000) 2.28       (0.676) 
InsiderCited 11.06***  (0.000) 18.22***  (0.000) 5.59***   (0.003) 12.62***  (0.000) 
MgmtConcerns 4.14      (0.418) 6.48      (0.485) 2.55       (0.673) 3.93      (0.720) 
OptionsIncreased -0.73      (0.561) 3.98      (0.361) -1.25       (0.340) 5.22      (0.251) 
PEFundInvolved 10.07***  (0.000) 17.19***  (0.000) 6.67***   (0.000) 10.52***  (0.002) 
SynergyCited 12.41**    (0.017) 24.42**    (0.028) 3.79       (0.343) 20.63*     (0.078) 
TakeoverChatter -0.62     (0.620) 2.69      (0.587) -0.97       (0.448) 3.65      (0.475) 
TargetDistress 1.72     (0.739) 1.67      (0.827) 1.75       (0.802) -0.08       (0.994) 
TargetInitiated 5.76**  (0.027) 12.45***  (0.002) 2.34       (0.484) 10.11**    (0.050) 
Undervalued 2.03     (0.226) 8.48**   (0.039) 0.42       (0.816) 8.06*      (0.071) 
UnusualActivity 8.44*    (0.066) 21.46*     (0.056) 2.43       (0.571) 19.03*     (0.100) 
BidderDenied -14.27*   (0.059) -33.27      (0.187) -6.45       (0.115) -26.82      (0.278) 
TargetDenied 1.33     (0.875) -3.84      (0.616) 4.29       (0.747) -8.13      (0.587) 
Informative 8.79*** (0.000) 14.53***  (0.000) 5.42***   (0.002) 9.10***  (0.007) 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis of target firm cumulative abnormal returns on the rumor date 
This table reports coefficient estimates for a series of OLS regressions of target firm cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on a 
number of explanatory variables. CARs are calculated as the sum of value-weighted market-model abnormal returns for target firms 
over days (0, +1) relative to the initial rumor date (day 0). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Firm fixed effects include 
Cashratio, Changesize2y, Concentration, Dormancy, Infoasymm, Prevmergers, Priorreturn2y, Resmismatch, ROA, Salesgrowth2y, 
Salesshock, SalesshockSq, and Shareturnover. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 17 industry classifications. News 
article fixed effects are created using all media sources with at least five scoop articles. Rumor fixed effects refer to individual rumor 
types that we found to be insignificant and thus omitted for brevity: BidderDenied, BlockPurchase, FinancingSource, IndustryActivity, 
MgmtConcerns, OptionsIncreased, PEFundInvolved, SynergyCited, TakeoverChatter, TargetDenied, TargetInitiated, Undervalued, 
and UnusualActivity. P-values based on clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)  
  CAR 
(0, +1) 
  CAR 
(0, +1) 
  CAR 
(0, +1) 
  CAR 
(0, +1) 
 
AdvisorHired  0.037*** (0.009)       
AnalystReport -0.012* (0.082)       
BidderMentioned  0.029*** (0.000)       
InsiderCited  0.026** (0.028)       
TargetDistress -0.060*** (0.005)       
Rumor CAR(-5, -1) -0.046 (0.408)   -0.038 (0.500) -0.039 (0.488) 
Rumor CAR(-41, -1)  0.001 (0.944)    0.004 (0.851)  0.001 (0.979) 
EstAnnReturn  0.057 (0.297)    0.078 (0.198)  0.062 (0.296) 
ValuableBrand -0.0037 (0.769)    0.011 (0.316)  0.014 (0.190) 
Informative    0.024*** (0.003)  0.026*** (0.003)  0.017** (0.036) 
Speculative   -0.015** (0.013) -0.016*** (0.008) -0.013** (0.027) 
Accurate        0.051*** (0.000) 
Firm FE Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Ind/Year FE No  Yes  No  No  
News FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Rumor FE Yes  No  No  No  
Constant -0.017 (0.800) -0.005 (0.874) -0.037 (0.595) -0.076 (0.293) 
N 1694  2015  1694  1694  
Adj. R2 0.08  0.04  0.05  0.07  
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Table 4: Rumor accuracy 
This table examines the relationship between rumor characteristics and the likelihood that a rumor comes true. Panel A, columns 1-4, 
present fixed effect logit regression results in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a merger rumor came 
true within one year of the initial rumor date, as indicated in either the SDC database or from a manual search of the Factiva database, 
and zero otherwise. Panel B is similar to Panel A, but adds the condition that target firm returns over days (-41, +1) relative to the 
takeover announcement date must be positive for the rumor to be considered accurate. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Firm fixed effects include Cashratio, Changesize2y, Concentration, Dormancy, Infoasymm, Prevmergers, Priorreturn2y, 
Resmismatch, ROA, Salesgrowth2y, Salesshock, SalesshockSq, Shareturnover, and Size. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-
French 17 industry classifications. News article fixed effects are created using all media sources with at least five scoop articles. 
Rumor fixed effects refer to individual rumor types that we found to be insignificant and thus omitted for brevity: AnalystReport, 
BidderDenied, BlockPurchase, FinancingSource, IndustryActivity, OptionsIncreased, PEFundInvolved, and TakeoverChatter. P-
values based on clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Rumor characteristics leading to takeover announcements within one year 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Accurate  Accurate  Accurate  Accurate  
AdvisorHired  0.615*** (0.009)  0.675*** (0.003)     
BidderMentioned  0.334** (0.047)  0.371** (0.027)     
InsiderCited  0.879*** (0.000)  0.882*** (0.000)     
MgmtConcerns  0.820*** (0.010)  0.781** (0.013)     
SynergyCited  1.026*** (0.001)  1.032*** (0.000)     
TargetDenied  0.727 (0.379)  0.707 (0.391)     
TargetDistress  0.693** (0.036)  0.659** (0.048)     
TargetInitiated  0.548** (0.048)  0.512* (0.061)     
Undervalued  0.340* (0.080)  0.347* (0.073)     
UnusualActivity  0.712** (0.050)  0.745** (0.041)     
Size -0.132** (0.013) -0.160*** (0.003)   -0.147*** (0.003) 
Rumor CAR(0, +1)  3.373*** (0.000)      3.752*** (0.000) 
Rumor CAR(-5, -1)  0.008 (0.992)  0.034 (0.968)    0.123 (0.886) 
Rumor CAR(-41, -1)  0.446* (0.075)  0.412* (0.099)    0.554** (0.028) 
ValuableBrand -0.462** (0.047) -0.460** (0.045)   -0.464** (0.029) 
EstDealLikelihood    0.400*** (0.000)     
Informative      0.885*** (0.000)  0.929*** (0.000) 
Speculative     -0.857*** (0.000) -0.567** (0.027) 
Ind/News/Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Rumor FE Yes  Yes  No  No  
Constant 1.365 (0.225) 1.669 (0.135) -2.361*** (0.000) 2.233** (0.043) 
N 1667  1667  2004  1667  
Pseudo R2 0.189  0.182  0.100  0.166  













Panel B: Rumor characteristics leading to ‘beneficial’ takeover announcements within one year 
 
       (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)  
 Accurate  Accurate  Accurate  Accurate  
AdvisorHired  0.821*** (0.003)  0.864*** (0.002)     
BidderMentioned  0.256 (0.210)  0.285 (0.158)     
InsiderCited  0.686*** (0.003)  0.681*** (0.004)     
MgmtConcerns  1.234*** (0.001)  1.183*** (0.002)     
SynergyCited  0.482 (0.141)  0.481 (0.139)     
TargetDenied  1.905** (0.045)  1.919** (0.041)     
TargetDistress -0.205 (0.596) -0.211 (0.586)     
TargetInitiated  0.0875 (0.797)  0.055 (0.872)     
Undervalued -0.193 (0.478) -0.186 (0.494)     
UnusualActivity  1.081** (0.011)  1.109** (0.011)     
Size -0.181*** (0.004) -0.206*** (0.001)   -0.174*** (0.002) 
Rumor CAR(0, +1)  2.646*** (0.000)      2.873*** (0.000) 
Rumor CAR(-5, -1)  2.293** (0.013)  2.251** (0.013)    2.172** (0.031) 
Rumor CAR(-41, -1)  0.872*** (0.001)  0.853*** (0.002)    1.037*** (0.000) 
ValuableBrand -0.624* (0.058) -0.618* (0.055)   -0.575* (0.055) 
EstDealLikelihood    0.353*** (0.006)     
Informative      0.521*** (0.001)  0.560*** (0.003) 
Speculative     -1.059*** (0.001) -0.736** (0.028) 
Ind/News/Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Rumor FE Yes  Yes  No  No  
Constant 2.039 (0.144) 2.256 (0.110) -2.699*** (0.000) 2.410* (0.074) 
N 1667  1667  2004  1667  
pseudo R2 0.202  0.200  0.083  0.174  













Table 5: Long-short portfolio returns  
This table reports monthly returns from an equally-weighted long-short portfolio by strategy. The first strategy, Rumor Characteristics, 
establishes a long position in targets of rumors with significant prediction power for rumor accuracy and a short position in rumors with 
no significant prediction power, as based on the prediction accuracy of rumor characteristics using logit model 1 in Table 4, Panel A. 
We exclude target firms with non-mutually exclusive rumor rationales. The second strategy, Rumor Informativeness, establishes a long 
position in Informative target firms and a short position in Speculative target firms. Amihud illiquidity is calculated as per Amihud 
(2002) and Ahern and Sosyura (2015): 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (|𝑟𝑡| 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡)⁄ . The proportional bid-ask spread is calculated as 100*(ask-bid)/M, 
where M is the midpoint of the bid and ask, using closing prices from CRSP. Low and High refer to observations relative to the median 
for each subsample. Firms are added to the portfolio on day 2 after the rumor is published, and are held for up to one year, with 
monthly rebalancing. If less than five firms meet the criteria for the long or short portfolio, the long/short portfolio return is assumed to 
be zero. We use the market model with the CRSP value weighted market return as a benchmark. The monthly returns presented here are 
the daily returns compounded over a period of 20 days. Newey and West (1987) p-values are reported in parentheses. We follow 
Newey and West (1994) to compute lags. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.  
Portfolio Strategy 
 All Amihud Illiquidity Proportional 
bid-ask spread 
  Low High Low High 


































Table 6: Multivariate analysis of rumored bidder firm cumulative abnormal returns  
This table reports coefficient estimates for a series of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for firms rumored to be 
potential bidders on a number of explanatory variables. CARs are calculated as the sum of value-weighted market-model abnormal 
returns for bidders relative to the initial rumor date (day 0). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Firm fixed effects 
include Cashratio, Changesize2y, Concentration, Dormancy, Infoasymm, Prevmergers, Priorreturn2y, Resmismatch, ROA, 
Salesgrowth2y, Salesshock, SalesshockSq, and Shareturnover. News article fixed effects are created using all media sources with at 
least five scoop articles. Rumor fixed effects refer to individual rumor types that we found to be insignificant and thus omitted for 
brevity: AdvisorHired, AnalystReport, FinancingSource, IndustryActivity, OptionsIncreased, TargetInitiated, Undervalued, and 
UnusualActivity. P-values based on clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  







BidderDenied -0.022 (0.513)  0.022* (0.051) -0.030 (0.573) 
BlockPurchase  0.056** (0.012) -0.003 (0.871)  0.054 (0.122) 
InsiderCited  0.003 (0.836) -0.008* (0.099)  0.007 (0.641) 
MgmtConcerns -0.021 (0.360)  0.006 (0.356) -0.042* (0.071) 
PEFundInvolved  0.001 (0.966)  0.014** (0.030) -0.011 (0.532) 
SynergyCited  0.022** (0.023)  0.000 (0.993)  0.002 (0.903) 
TakeoverChatter  0.033*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.374)  0.001 (0.950) 
TargetDenied  0.010 (0.577) -0.018* (0.067) -0.039 (0.351) 
TargetDistress  0.001 (0.987)  0.019** (0.043) -0.017 (0.519) 
Accurate  0.009 (0.346)  0.001 (0.890) -0.020 (0.102) 
EstAnnReturn_B  0.054 (0.415)  0.065** (0.012)  0.044 (0.563) 
ValuableBrand  0.012 (0.143) -0.002 (0.493)  0.001 (0.886) 
RumoredBidderCAR(-5,-1)   -0.042 (0.339)  0.095 (0.376) 
News FE   Yes    Yes    Yes  
Rumor FE   Yes    Yes    Yes  
Constant  0.095* (0.083)  0.012 (0.585)  0.055 (0.412) 
N  568   568   568  
Adj. R2  0.04   0.03  -0.01  















Table 7: Target firm runup, markup, and premium relative to the announcement date 
This table presents fixed effect OLS regression results of cumulative abnormal stock returns and premiums of merger targets in 
various windows measured relative to the announcement date as recorded in SDC. Observations include mergers of public U.S. targets 
that were announced between 2002 and 2011 seeking a change in majority ownership. Offer Premium represents the final offer 
premium from SDC (truncated at -100% and 200%) as suggested by Officer (2003) and Jenter and Lewellen (2015), among others. 
Deal characteristics include Completed, MajorityCash, TenderOffer, LBO, CrossBorder, and TargetDefenses, as defined in Ahern and 
Sosyura (2015). Firm-level controls include past year’s sales growth, target size (log of market equity), Tobin’s Q ((total assets-
common equity + market equity)/total assets), and a dummy for a valuable brand. Rumor fixed effects in Panel B refer to individual 
rumor types that we found to be insignificant and thus omitted for brevity: AnalystReport, BidderDenied, BidderMentioned, 
FinancingSource, IndustryActivity, MgmtConcerns, OptionsIncreased, PEFundInvolved, TakeoverChatter, TargetDenied, 
Undervalued, and UnusualActivity. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. P-values based on clustered standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effect of rumor existence on runup, markup, and premium  

















Rumor 0.028 -0.125*** -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.097*** -0.074*** 0.085** -0.034 
 (0.185) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.007) (0.050) (0.447) 
AcqPublic     0.058** 0.057***   
     (0.011) (0.007)   
AcqTermFee     -0.024 -0.002   
     (0.189) (0.935)   
Friendly     0.068 0.022   
     (0.164) (0.742)   
ROA     -0.117** -0.003   
     (0.046) (0.939)   
TarTermFee     0.098*** 0.073***   
     (0.001) (0.005)   
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.240* 0.393*** 0.141 0.489*** -0.047 0.274 -0.207 0.177 
 (0.069) (0.001) (0.442) (0.005) (0.813) (0.139) (0.378) (0.509) 
N 1815 1815 1815 1750 1815 1750 1815 1815 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.126 0.121 0.109 0.141 0.118 0.044 0.090 















Panel B: Effect of individual rumor types on runup, markup, and premium  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








AdvisorHired 0.225** -0.134*** 0.095 -0.085 
 (0.041) (0.001) (0.377) (0.154) 
BlockPurchase -0.028 0.160** 0.136 0.027 
 (0.825) (0.036) (0.210) (0.689) 
InsiderCited 0.214*** -0.032 0.182** 0.102** 
 (0.009) (0.393) (0.023) (0.046) 
SynergyCited 0.066 -0.142** -0.078 -0.064 
 (0.697) (0.049) (0.641) (0.471) 
TargetDistress 0.176 -0.132** 0.050 -0.103 
 (0.127) (0.021) (0.658) (0.188) 
TargetInitiated -0.162* -0.085** -0.238** -0.186*** 
 (0.098) (0.033) (0.026) (0.001) 
AcqPublic 0.022 0.019 0.048 0.056** 
 (0.472) (0.302) (0.152) (0.015) 
AcqTermFee 0.018 -0.048*** -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.457) (0.001) (0.261) (0.124) 
Friendly 0.088 0.060 0.148* 0.062 
 (0.255) (0.127) (0.075) (0.215) 
ROA -0.061 -0.071* -0.117 -0.122** 
 (0.419) (0.058) (0.186) (0.041) 
TarTermFee 0.084** 0.056*** 0.160*** 0.093*** 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rumor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.379 0.283** -0.122 -0.007 
 (0.107) (0.025) (0.657) (0.970) 
N 1815 1815 1815 1750 
Adj. R2 0.052 0.138 0.109 0.141 


























Appendix A     Variable Definitions  
Rumor content characteristics 
AdvisorHired Rumor indicates that the target firm has retained the services of an investment bank or 
financial advisor 
AnalystReport Rumor is the result of one or more analysts reasoning that a takeover seems logical  
BidderDenied Rumor indicates that a potential bidding firm denies that parties are in negotiations 
BidderMentioned Rumor indicates the name of one or more potential bidders 
BlockPurchase Rumor indicates that 5% or more of shares outstanding has recently been purchased by a single 
entity 
FinancingSource Rumor provides substantial details as to how financing for the deal would occur 
IndustryActivity Rumor indicates either a competitor is being taken over or that the target industry appears ripe 
for takeovers  
Informative Rumors based on at least three rumor justifications, excluding those labelled as speculative 
InsiderCited Rumor predicated on an anonymous source  
MgmtConcerns Rumor indicates concerns with the current management  
OptionsIncreased Rumor specifically mentions that an increase in call options is indicative of an impending 
takeover  
PEFundInvolved Rumor indicates that a private equity or hedge fund has expressed interest in a potential 
takeover deal 
Speculative Rumors based solely on either takeover chatter or an increase in option activity in the target 
firm, with no further justification provided 
SynergyCited Rumor indicates that the target firm has specific attributes that would provide unique synergies 
to an acquirer  
TakeoverChatter Rumor provides few details, yet mentions that the target firm is subject to ongoing takeover 
chatter 
TargetDenied Rumor indicates that the target firm denies that parties are in negotiations 
TargetDistress Rumor indicates that the target firm has been experiencing substantial financial and/or 
operating distress 
TargetInitiated Rumor has been initiated by the target firm itself  
Undervalued Rumor indicates that the target firm may be seen as undervalued, prompting takeover interest 
UnusualActivity Rumor indicates that something unusual has occurred which has led to takeover speculation 
(e.g. two CEOs simultaneously absent from conference, or other changes in executive team 
schedules or habits) 
Other variables 
Accurate The rumored target firm becomes subject to a formal takeover announcement within one 
calendar year after the initial rumor date (Ahern and Sosyura, 2015) 
Cashratio The ratio of cash and marketable securities to marketable assets (Cornett et al., 2011) 
Changesize2y The percentage change in the firm’s total assets over the previous two years (Cornett et al., 
2011) 
Concentration The ratio of sales of the largest four firms to total three-digit SIC industry sales (Cornett et al., 
2011) 
Dormancy The number of months since the last merger in the same three-digit SIC industry (Cornett et 
al., 2011) 
EstAnnReturn The expected announcement return of the target firm if a takeover announcement does come 
true, estimated from a linear regression of target announcement day returns on target size, 
industry, and year fixed effects in a sample of 2,342 official merger announcements of public 
targets over the period from 2002 to 2011 as provided by the SDC database (Ahern and 
Sosyura, 2015) 
EstAnnReturn_B The expected announcement return of the rumored bidding firm if a takeover announcement 
does come true, estimated from a linear regression of bidder announcement day returns on 
bidder size, industry, and year fixed effects in a sample of 2,342 official merger 
announcements over the period from 2002 to 2011 as provided by the SDC database  
EstDealLikelihood The rumor date target firm return divided by the EstAnnReturn (Ahern and Sosyura, 2015) 













book value greater than the industry median) and opaque (share turnover is lower than the 
industry median) (Cornett et al., 2011) 
Prevmergers Counts the number of times a firm proposes or receives a merger bid in the prior two years 
(Cornett et al., 2011) 
Priorreturn2y The change in a firm’s stock price in the two years prior to a given quarter (Cornett et al., 
2011) 
Resmismatch An indicator variable equal to one if i) sales growth for a firm in the last two years is less than 
the industry median and the long-term debt ratio (the ratio of the book value of long-term debt 
to total assets) is greater than the industry median, or ii) if sales growth in the last two years is 
greater than the industry median and the long-term debt ratio is less than the industry median, 
and zero otherwise (Cornett et al., 2011) 
ROA The ratio of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) items to total assets (Cornett et 
al., 2011) 
Salesgrowth2y The percentage change in the firm’s sales over the previous two years (Cornett et al., 2011) 
Salesshock The absolute value of the difference between the two-year median industry sales growth rate 
and the two-year median sales growth rate of all sample target firms (Cornett et al., 2011) 
SalesshockSq The square of sales shock (Cornett et al., 2011) 
Shareturnover The ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the firm to total shares outstanding 
(Cornett et al., 2011) 
Size The natural log of total assets as per the most recent quarter prior to the rumor date (Cornett et 
al., 2011) 
ValuableBrand An indicator variable representing target firm inclusion in a list of the top 100 brands from the 
marketing consultancy firms Interbrand and BrandZ anytime between 2002 and 2011 (Ahern 



















 Takeover rumor rationales significantly predict future takeover announcements  
 Market reversal following takeover rumors depends on rumor article characteristics 
 Not all takeover rumors are good news for the target firm 
 Rumors providing multiple linkages to potential takeovers appear more credible 
 Rumor characteristics as well as the length of the runup period affect bid prices 
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